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HOW TO BE CRITICAL
STEPHEN

M. FELDMAN*

INTRODUCTION

What is critical legal theory, as opposed to traditional legal
theory? Traditional legal theory is simultaneously descriptive and
prescriptive. Traditional theorists seek to describe how a large
number of judicial decisions can be either reduced to a small set of
axiomatic principles, synthesized into a coherent framework, or both.
Traditional legal theory, first and foremost, tries to make sense of the
past.
John Hart Ely's constitutional theory of representation
reinforcement,1 for instance, explains how a significant number of
Warren Court decisions, most prominently Brown v. Board of
Education,2 are supposedly consistent with and animated by a
commitment to an overarching principle: representative democracy.
The Supreme Court's role, according to this theory, is to police the
democratic process.3 If the democratic process is fair and open, then
the Court should defer to legislative judgments, regardless of the
substantive content of those judgments4 If, however, the democratic
process is somehow defective, then the Court should deem the
legislative action unconstitutional.'
The Warren Court's 1966
decision in Harperv. Virginia Board of Elections6 held that poll taxes
in state elections were unconstitutional because, according to Ely,
such taxes prevented some citizens from participating fully in the
democratic process.7 The state was unable to articulate a sufficiently

* Professor of Law and Associate Member of Political Science, University of Tulsa. I
thank Jay Mootz for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See ELY, supra note 1, at 73.
4. See id. at 75-80.
5. See id.
6. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
7. See ELY, supra note 1, at 120.
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compelling reason for undermining the representative democratic
processes.'
Once Ely describes this principle of representative democracy as
animating the key Warren Court decisions, he can use it for
prescriptive purposes, either to recommend how the Court should
decide future cases or to criticize how the Court has decided previous
cases. Most famously, Ely criticized the early Burger Court decision
of Roe v. Wade9 as indefensible under representation-reinforcement
theory. 10 If the justices had focused on the fairness of the democratic
process, Ely argued, then the Court would have upheld the antiabortion statutes, regardless of the justices' personal sentiments about
abortion." But the Court, according to Ely, had not restrained itself
to policing the democratic process but instead had intruded into the
sphere of legislative decision making. The Court, in other words, had
contravened the overarching principle of representative democracy
12
and thus had acted in an unjustifiable manner.
Critical legal theory has a different focus and purpose than
traditional legal theory. To be sure, as defined, traditional theory is
in part critical. Traditional legal theorists routinely invoke their
theories to criticize particular judicial decisions or to recommend
future judicial and legislative courses. Yet, whereas traditional theory
generally accepts the assumptions and premises that undergird the
bulk of judicial decisions in a field, critical theory often aims to doubt
and disrupt those very assumptions and premises. The descriptive
component of traditional theory, in particular, accepts the status quo
to a large degree, while critical theory either attacks or at least
questions the status quo. While traditional theory aims to make sense
of the cases, critical theory often aims to show how the cases are
unprincipled and even nonsensical. Most broadly, critical legal theory
is intellectual activity oriented toward criticizing the dominant modes
of understanding law, practicing law, or deciding cases.
To some degree, the term "critical theory" is oxymoronic.
Traditional theory, as discussed, not only largely accepts the status
8. See id. For a discussion of how representation-reinforcement theory fits within the
legal process school of thought that emerged after World War II, see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN,
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM
LECTUAL VOYAGE 134-36, 147, 150 (2000).

TO POSTMODERNISM:

AN INTEL-

9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).

11. See id.
12. See id. at 926.
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quo but also aims to prescriptively guide practice, legal or otherwise.
To some theorists, such prescriptive guidance is the sine qua non of
theory. 3 Critical theorists, though, typically aim to disrupt ordinary
practices. Such intellectual work might be better referred to as
critical activity, rather than critical theory, because it is oriented more
toward questioning and displacing than guiding our legal practices.
To be sure, critical theorists often aim to disrupt ordinary practices so
that they might be replaced with more just practices. Even in such
circumstances, however, critical theorists rarely lay out a road map to
14
guide future legal practices, as traditional theorists are apt to do.
The basic assumptions of the status quo weigh all of us down as if we
were wearing cement boots.15
Consequently, from the critical
thinker's standpoint, to disturb a reader's comfortable acquiescence
to the status quo so that she might reconsider some basic assumptions
is heavy work. Attempting to go further, trying to imagine some
radical alternative to the status quo and to persuade the reader to
follow that alternative is likely to be futile and even foolish. To crack
the reader's cement boots sufficiently that she might contemplate
twisting around, looking in a different direction, is the critical
thinker's primary task and ambition. And it is an ambition that often
16
proves difficult to fulfill.
While the term "critical activity" might more accurately describe
the work of critical thinkers, such thinkers nonetheless occasionally
theorize about their own critical activities. From this perspective,
then, critical theory might be understood most precisely as a metaactivity: a method or approach that could guide one who seeks to
engage in critical activity. A critical theory might assert, for instance,
that if one seeks to do critical activity, then one should follow steps
one, two, and three, or something of the sort. To actually do the
critical work, however-to disrupt dominant assumptions and

13. For this reason, Stanley Fish asserts that "antifoundationalist theory," which is
somewhat typical of postmodern thought, "really isn't a theory at all; it is an argument against
the possibility of theory." Stanley Fish, Consequences, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 433, 439 (1985).
14. See David Couzens Hoy, CriticalTheory and CriticalHistory, in DAVID COUZENS HoY
& THOMAS MCCARTHY, CRITICAL THEORY 101, 106-07, 202 (1994) (suggesting the possibility
of differentiating between critical theory and critical activity).
15. Marx wrote: "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the
brain of the living." Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in THE MARXENGELS READER 594, 595 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978).
16. For a discussion of how postmodernists generally refrain from making the normative
recommendations that are common in modernist scholarship, see FELDMAN, supra note 8, at
174-78.
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practices-one would need to implement steps one, two, and three,
rather than theorizing about those steps. 7
The central question for this essay is the following: Given the
nature of critical activity and theory, how can one be critical? My
thesis is that Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics ,l s
when combined with Jirgen Habermas's communicative (or
discourse) theory 19 or Jacques Derrida's deconstruction,2Q can guide us
toward critical activity. Part I briefly summarizes philosophical
hermeneutics. Part II examines the relationship between Gadamer's
hermeneutics and critical legal activity. Philosophical hermeneutics
explains, on the one hand, how we can come to understand critical
concepts and, on the other hand, how being critical can be a difficult
17. There is a long-running debate concerning the effectiveness of theorizing as a practice.
See Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723 (1982);
Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneuticsand Deconstruction, 14
CRITICAL INQUIRY 49 (1987); Steven Mailloux, Truth or Consequences: On Being Against
Theory, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 760 (1983); Richard Rorty, Philosophy Without Principles, 11
CRITICAL INQUIRY 459 (1985).
18. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960) [hereinafter GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD]; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Destruktion and Deconstruction (Geoff Waite & Richard
Palmer trans.), in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER
102 (Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer eds., 1989) [hereinafter Gadamer,
Deconstruction];Hans-Georg Gadamer, On the Scope and Function of HermeneuticalReflection
(G.B. Hess & R.E. Palmer trans., 1967), in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 18 (David E.
Linge ed. & trans., 1976) [hereinafter Gadamer, On the Scope]; Hans-Georg Gadamer, The
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem (David Linge trans.), in JOSEF BLEICHER,
CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS AS METHOD, PHILOSOPHY AND CRITIQUE

128 (1980) [hereinafter Gadamer, Universality]. Excellent analyses of Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics are in GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION AND
REASON (1987), and JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF
TRUTHAND METHOD (1985).
19. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., Mass. Inst. Tech. 1996)

(1992)

[hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]; JORGEN HABERMAS,

LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975) (1973) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS]; 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy

trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981)
HABERMAS,

[hereinafter 1 HABERMAS, THE THEORY]; 2 JORGEN

THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE

ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A

CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981)
[hereinafter 2 HABERMAS, THE THEORY]; Jorgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to
Universality, in BLEICHER, supra note 18, at 181 [hereinafter Habermas, Universality]; Jurgen
Habermas, A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL
INQUIRY 335-63 (Fred R. Dallmayr & Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977) [hereinafter Habermas,
Review].
20. See JACQUES DERRIDA, DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH
JACQUES DERRIDA (John D. Caputo ed., 1997) [hereinafter DERRIDA, NUTSHELL]; JACQUES
DERRIDA, OF GPAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1976) (1967) [hereinafter DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY]; JACQUES DERRIDA, Structure,

Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278 (Alan
Bass trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1978) (1967) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Structure].
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task. The subsections of Part II then explore first, how Habermas's
discourse theory and second, how Derrida's deconstruction can
supplement philosophical hermeneutics to help engender critical
activity.
I.

GADAMER'S PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

Modernists view textual understanding from within their
archetypal subject-object metaphysics: the subject or self stands
separate from an objective world. To have knowledge, according to
the modernists, the subject must somehow bridge the gap between
itself and the objects of the world. The subject needs either to
directly access those objects or, at least, to mirror them in
consciousness.2" If the modernist subject cannot bridge the gap to,
and connect with, the objective world, then the subject is left floating
untethered through an abyss of relativism, nihilism, and solipsism.
Thus, from this modernist vantage, in order to understand or to know
the meaning of a text, the subject or self needs to access the objective
meaning of the text. To do so, the subject needs to implement a
method or technique that overcomes or neutralizes her prejudices
and thus reveals the true meaning of the text. For example, according
to some modernist jurisprudents, to understand the objective
meaning of a constitutional provision, a judge supposedly needs to
ascertain the framers' intentions when they wrote that provision.2 2 If
a judge does not invoke a method that divulges the objective meaning
in this manner, then the judge inevitably becomes an unconstrained
rogue, and constitutional interpretation becomes a political free-for213
all where anything goes.
Gadamer follows Heidegger by repudiating the subject-object
metaphysics of modernism. 21 The subject never stands separately and
independently from the objective world, and hence, "our perception
is never a simple reflection of what is given to the senses." 5 Instead,
according to Gadamer, the self or subject's very being-in-the-world is
21. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).

22. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 159 (1990) ("The interpretation
of the Constitution according to the original understanding, then, is the only method that can
preserve the Constitution, the separation of powers, and the liberties of the people.").
23. See J.M. Balkin, Ideology As Constraint,43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1141 (1991) (discussing
the "rogue judge").
24. See FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 30; see also Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics:
The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence,76 IOWA L. REV. 661, 681-82 (1991).
25.

GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 18, at 90.
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interpretive. 6 Hence, Gadamer proceeds to explain textual understanding in a fashion that differs radically from the modernist view.
Gadamer emphasizes that we all live within the cultural tradition
(or traditions) of a community.7 The communal tradition inculcates
each individual with prejudices that open us to the possibility of
understanding textual meaning. Thus, whereas the modernist insists
that prejudices must be overcome or banished so that we can
perspicaciously understand a text, Gadamer argues that prejudices
are a necessary prerequisite to textual understanding.28 Prejudices,
that is, enable or empower us. As soon as we turn to a text, our
prejudices imbue us with a fore-understanding-a first understanding
of the text that initiates and orients the remainder of the interpretive
process.
As one penetrates deeper into the text, our foreunderstanding can give way to more refined interpretations of the
text, and indeed, our prejudices can be transformed during this
process.
Yet, without our prejudices, derived from communal
tradition, interpretation cannot even begin.
Significantly, though, prejudices not only enable but also
constrain understanding. We are never free and independent subjects
floating untethered through an abyss because our prejudices limit
what we can understand and perceive. Our prejudices constitute a
horizon: "the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen
from a particular vantage point. 29 Quite simply, we cannot see
beyond our horizon, though our horizon constantly shifts and moves.
The Gadamerian maxim that our being-in-the-world is
interpretive means, then, that all of our understanding, perceptions,
and experiences are simultaneously enabled and constrained by our
prejudices, which are derived from communal traditions. Even
prereflective textual understanding-understanding of a text that
seems immediate and plain-arises only because we are already and
always situated within our horizons of prejudices and traditions. Yet,
Gadamer adds:
This formulation certainly does not mean that we are enclosed
within a wall of prejudices and only let through the narrow portals
those things that can produce a pass saying, "Nothing new will be
said here." Instead we welcome just that guest who promises
something new to our curiosity. But how do we know the guest
26.
27.
28.
29.

See FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 30.
See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 18, at 202.
See id. at 302.
Id.
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whom we admit is one who has something new to say to us? Is not
our expectation and our readiness to hear the new also necessarily
30
determined by the old that has already taken possession of us?
Gadamer analogizes textual understanding to a conversation or
dialogue between the interpreter and the text. 31 As soon as the
interpreter turns to a text, she presumes that it has something
meaningful to say-that it contains some "unity of meaning" that is
complete and intelligible. 32 The interpreter begins with a foreunderstanding of the text, but by questioning the text, listening to its
answers, asking new questions, and listening to more answers, the
interpreter's understanding of the text shifts. This give and take
process, this dialogical interplay of the interpreter's prejudices and
the text, produces a "fusion of horizons '33 or "consensus over
meaning" 34 between the interpreter and the text. Understanding, as
Gadamer puts it, "is, primarily, agreement. ' 35 Hence, the interpreter
does not discover an objective meaning in the text by applying some
method or mechanical process, as modernists assert. Rather, through
the conversation of the hermeneutic process, the truth or meaning of
36
the text emerges or "comes into being."

II. CRITICAL LEGAL ACTIVITY

How can Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics contribute to
critical legal activity? For one thing, Gadamer explains how we come
to understand a text or a concept. For example, contrary to the critics
of postmodernism, hermeneutics does not undermine the rule of law
but rather explains how we can understand a rule of law in the first
place. 37 Likewise, if we wish to discuss the justice or injustice of
certain legal arrangements, then Gadamer reveals how the concept of
justice becomes meaningful. Justice is not grounded on some firm
modernist foundation and does not have an objective meaning, but
we nonetheless can understand and discuss the meaning of justice.
We open to the meaning of justice from the horizon of our prejudices,

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
WASH.

Gadamer, Universality, supra note 18, at 133.
See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 18, at 386-88.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 388.
WARNKE, supra note 18, at 107.
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 18, at 180.
Id. at 462.
See Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68
L. REv. 249 (1993).
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which are derived from our communal traditions. 38 In other words, if
not for our interpretive being-in-the-world, we could not discuss
justice at all.39 From this vantage, philosophical hermeneutics
provides sustenance to both traditional theory and to critical activity
or theory. Whether one seeks to develop a theory to prescriptively
guide legal practice-that is, a traditional theory-or one seeks
instead to question the underlying assumptions hidden within our
ordinary legal practice-that is, critical activity-Gadamer explains
how the understanding necessary for such intellectual work is
possible.
Yet, Gadamer also helps explain why engaging in critical activity,
in particular, can be such a formidable task. Gadamer encourages us
to risk our prejudices and traditions in our interpretive encounters, as
we open to the message of the text.40 But if understanding is possible
only because of our participation in communal traditions, as Gadamer
argues, 41 then the questioning or disrupting of the basic assumptions
produced by such traditions is likely to be extremely difficult to
accomplish. To be sure, traditions are contingent and must be
constantly reconstructed, yet they have a powerful inertia. Our
traditions limit our possibilities. Speech or writing that is aligned or
consistent with the dominant communal traditions and personal
prejudices of a reader or listener is most likely to seem persuasive or
forceful. Such speech or writing, in other words, will tend to be
effective or persuasive exactly because it fits with our assumptions or
preconceived notions. At the same time, any critical activity-that is,
writing or speech that cuts against the grain-is likely to seem
confused, offensive, or downright ridiculous exactly because it is in
tension with the dominant traditions and prejudices. Such speech or
writing rarely will be able to overcome our preconceived notions that
suggest its message is wrong-headed. Nevertheless, critical activity
must occur from within our communal traditions. There is no other
position-no external and objective standpoint-from which to
operate, critically or otherwise.
Partly because critical activity can be so difficult, a certain
method (or methods) might be especially useful for a critical thinker.
38. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Politicsof PostmodernJurisprudence,95 MICH. L. REV.
166,197 (1996).
39. See id. at 197-98.
40. See Stephen M. Feldman, Made for Each Other: The Interdependence of Deconstruction
and PhilosophicalHermeneutics, 26 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 51, 53, 58-59 (2000).
41. See Feldman, supra note 38, at 197.
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An efficacious method might help a critical thinker at least spark
critique, getting it moving, despite the obstacles that must be
overcome. What Gadamer does not do, however, is provide a
method for engaging in either traditional or critical theory (or
activity). In fact, Gadamer studiously avoids articulating any method
or technique for understanding a text. That purposeful shunning of
method is the ironic point of the title of his magnum opus, Truth and
Method: Method cannot possibly reveal an objective truth or meaning
for a text. Instead, as discussed, the truth of a text emerges through
the hermeneutic process itself.
Significantly, though, Gadamer's deprecation of method within
the hermeneutic process does not translate into a rejection of method
in all our practices. Indeed, philosophical hermeneutics can be
supplemented with various methods to generate critical activities, or
more precisely, certain methods can orient understanding and
interpretation to be critical (or at least, that is my thesis). Such
methods, then, can be understood to be critical theories insofar as
they can guide one seeking to engage in critical activity. In particular,
I focus on Habermas's communicative theory and Derrida's
deconstruction as possible means for supplementing philosophical
hermeneutics. Habermas, Derrida, and Gadamer share a crucial
purpose: each in his own way attempts to identify and explain the
conditions for human understanding, given the repudiation of subjectobject metaphysics. Because this common purpose lies at the root of
all their philosophies, the possible intertwining and grafting of their
various approaches is likely to be fruitful.
A.

Habermasand Gadamer

Habermas criticizes Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics as
being relativistic and politically conservative. 42 From Habermas's
perspective, Gadamer's hermeneutics fails to provide an adequate43
criterion for evaluating competing interpretations of a text.
Ultimately, the only basis for evaluating different interpretations is
the authority of tradition, and thus, philosophical hermeneutics
becomes exceedingly conservative. 44 Some other commentators
concur with this assessment of Gadamer. John Caputo, for instance,
42.
note 18,
43.
44.

For a summary of the dispute between Habermas and Gadamer, see WARNKE, supra
at 107-38.
See id.
See id.
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a

Even so, Habermas's discourse theory shares much with
Gadamer's hermeneutics.
Habermas deems his theory to be
postmetaphysical, meaning that, like Gadamer, he rejects subjectobject metaphysics. 47 Habermas contends that "[r]eaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech, ' 48 which resonates
partly with Gadamer's assertion that human being-in-the-world is
interpretive. Like Gadamer, then, Habermas seeks in part to identify
the conditions for human understanding. He agrees with Gadamer
that "knowledge is rooted in actual tradition; it remains bound to
contingent conditions. ' 149 Moreover, Habermas concurs that understanding is sowed in consensus. 0
Habermas maintains, however, that Gadamer fails to recognize
that consensus sometimes arises not because of the truth of an
assertion but because of systematic distortions of the hermeneutic
process. 1 In order to identify such systematic distortions, Habermas
insists that the hermeneutic process must be supplemented with a
critical method.52 To arrive at this critical method, Habermas
distinguishes between, on the one hand, the communicative
interaction and symbolic reproduction of our "lifeworld" and, on the
other hand, the strategic interaction and material reproduction of our
economic and administrative systems.53 Within the economic and
administrative systems, strategically rational actions are sometimes
appropriate. 4 For example, we might act strategically in the
economic marketplace to try to maximize our profits without regard
for the effects on other actors. Yet, while perhaps appropriate to the
economic and administrative systems, such strategic rationality
45. JOHN D. CAPUTO, RADICAL HERMENEUTICS: REPETITION, DECONSTRUCTION, AND

THE HERMENEUTIC PROJECT 5 (1987).
46. John D. Caputo, Gadamer's Closet Essentialism:A Derridian Critique, in DIALOGUE
AND DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER, supra note 18, at 258, 259.
47. Habermas asserts that "no plausible alternatives exist" to "postmetaphysical thinking."
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 19, at 443.

48. 1 HABERMAS, THE THEORY, supra note 19, at 287.
49. Habermas, Review, supra note 19, at 358.
50. "Rationally motivated decisions can be arrived at only on the basis of a consensus that
is brought about by convincing speech." Habermas, Universality, supra note 19, at 184.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 184-85.
53. See 1 HABERMAS, THE THEORY, supra note 19, at 340-43; 2 HABERMAS, THE
THEORY, supra note 19, at 150-52.
54. See 1 HABERMAS, THE THEORY, supra note 19, at 340-42.
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inevitably interferes with communicative action or discourse.55
Communicative interaction in the lifeworld should be directed toward
mutual understanding and governed by the force of the best
argument, but when strategic rationality colonizes our lifeworld, then
communication is skewed or distorted.5 6 The best argument no longer
necessarily wins.
To correct for this defect in communication, Habermas proposes
a critical method that can purify discourse by removing the distortions
that arise from strategic and material forces. The crux of Habermas's
critical method is his conception of the counterfactual "ideal speech
situation."57
The ideal speech situation is a counterfactual
intersubjective encounter that is cleansed of domination, coercion,
and other distortions arising from material forces and strategic
rationality.5 8 A consensus that emerges from the ideal speech
situation reflects the force of the best argument only and thus allows
us to identify truth and normative legitimacy. 59 Consequently, the
ideal speech situation "makes possible unforced universal
agreement." 6 The possibility for validating truth and normative
legitimacy in this manner is, according to Habermas, universally
presupposed by the very act of communication. 6
Moreover,
Habermas maintains that unless we posit the ideal speech situation as
a critical standpoint, we have no method or means for distinguishing
between a legitimate communicative consensus that manifests truth
and an illegitimate consensus that arose from distorted
communicative processes. 62
We need some meta-hermeneutic
approach so that we can critique communication and consensus; we
must have, in other words, "a reference system that goes beyond the
framework of tradition as such; only then can tradition also be

55. See id. at 340-41.
56. See HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 19, at 107-08.
57. Habermas, Universality,supra note 19, at 206.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. See 1 HABERMAS, THE THEORY, supra note 19, at 137, 306-08. According to David
Couzens Hoy:
For Habermas a rational unity emerges from a social plurality of forms of life insofar
as any form of life must contain "universal structures" that are revealed in
communicative action. These universal structures are not present by chance, or by
haphazard evolutionary luck, but are transcendentally necessary presuppositions, no
matter how mired they are in contingent motives and compulsions.
Hoy, supra note 14, at 181.
62. See Habermas, Review, supra note 19, at 358.
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criticized." 63 Otherwise, we are likely to succumb to ideological
forces, without being aware that we are doing so.
Gadamer's response is predictable yet powerful. He rejects
Habermas's critical method by insisting that the hermeneutic
situation is universal: we can never escape our interpretive being-inthe-world. 64 For that reason, according to Gadamer, there never can
be a critical reference system that stands outside of tradition. 65
Critical activity, in short, must itself necessarily be an interpretive act
rather than a meta-hermeneutic process or method. Thus, to
Gadamer, Habermas's effort to supplement the hermeneutic process
with a critical method is misplaced.
Gadamer is both right and wrong. Gadamer is right in asserting
that all understanding, including critical activity, is hermeneutic. Any
text or text-analogue-anything that is understood-is necessarily
understood hermeneutically, understood because of our participation
in our communal traditions. Moreover, our very being-in-the-world is
interpretive. Thus critique must proceed hermeneutically, from
within our horizons.
All of this, though, does not mean that method cannot
supplement the hermeneutic process. In particular, a method can
orient or guide interpretive activities toward critique. For instance, to
take issue not only with Gadamer but also with Stanley Fish, throwing
a baseball is a physical or mechanical process that can be guided
(though not controlled) by a method. 66 I can articulate a method or
series of steps for throwing a baseball that can be invoked to teach
small children how to throw. I might tell a child to grip the ball
loosely, reach back, start to bring her arm forward with the elbow
bent, and so forth. To formulate as well as to understand my words is
certainly a hermeneutic activity; as such, it does not entail the
application of method. Indeed, if throwing a baseball is meaningful
to us in any way whatsoever-and why else would we do it-then the
actual physical throwing is itself an interpretive activity. This
hermeneutic quality of the physical action of throwing follows from
Gadamer's claim that our very being-in-the-world is interpretive.

63. Id.
64. Gadamer, Universality, supra note 18, at 128, 134.
65. See id. at 134-35.
66. See Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987)
(arguing that theory is irrelevant to the practice of pitching a baseball as well as to all other
practices).
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Even so, to throw a baseball is a practice that might be guided, at
least initially, by some method.
Significantly, even Gadamer acknowledges that some practices,
particularly science, include methods that ought to be followed.
"Whoever wants to learn a science has to learn to master its
methodology. '' 67 Indeed, the role of method, whether in science or in
learning to throw a baseball, can be explained in hermeneutic terms.
When I teach a child the method for throwing, for instance, I am
communicating the tradition of baseball throwing to the child with the
hope that I will instill certain prejudices in her about how to throw.
After all, we could throw baseballs differently from how we normally
do so (we might, for instance, throw a baseball more as we throw a
football). At the same time, once a child learns how to throw, the
throwing motion is not merely a matter of articulating or recalling
certain prejudices or techniques. Although Gadamer does not
adequately explain this important point, prejudices often "are learned
6
or absorbed in a deep sense; they become embodied in individuals."
To borrow from the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who emphasizes the
embodiment of practices, we might say that prejudices sometimes are
"state[s] of the body" rather than merely "state[s] of mind. '69 An
experienced baseball player just knows how to throw a ball without
thinking about or discussing it. This embodied knowledge, though, is
still meaningful and therefore hermeneutic.
Critical legal activity can be understood as a practice similar to
science or to throwing a baseball: it is a practice that might be
informed or guided (but never controlled) by method (or in other
words, by a critical theory). Gadamer must admit that either we
question our traditions and prejudices, doubting their legitimacy, or
we accept them uncritically. If we accept them uncritically, then
Habermas is correct; philosophical hermeneutics becomes a type of
Burkean conservatism.70 But hermeneutics can be critical, and
Habermas shows us one way (or method) to view it so. Habermas's
critical method can guide us as we struggle to identify forces
distorting our conversations with others, and hence he can help us
67. Gadamer, Universality, supra note 18, at 135. Gadamer also refers to "the impressive
methodology of modern science." Id.
68. Feldman, supra note 38, at 181.
69. PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACrTICE 68 (Richard Nice trans., Polity Press
1990) (1980).
70. Sometimes, especially when responding to Habermas, Gadamer does sound
conservative. See Gadamer, On the Scope, supra note 18, at 33-34 (discussing the authority of
tradition).
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recognize where our traditions have arisen because of illegitimate
force, duplicity, or other distortive elements. For example, if one
person in a conversation acts strategically, for the purpose of
maximizing his or her own personal benefits, then we should expect
the conversation to be skewed. I do not agree with Habermas's
assertions that he has identified universal validity claims within the
ideal speech situation, that his critical method can lead to universal
truths, or that critical activity must be meta-hermeneutic. In my
opinion, both Habermas and Gadamer, in their zealousness to refute
each other, occasionally overstate their respective cases. Regardless
of these hyperbolic claims, Habermas's ideal speech situation can be
used as a means for identifying distortive forces within our
communities and conversations, but such critical activities always and
already are interpretive.
B.

Derridaand Gadamer

Derridean deconstruction presents an alternative method for
generating critical legal activity. In fact, some commentators claim
that deconstruction is no more than a method. From this perspective,
deconstruction is politically neutral; it can be used by both
progressives and conservatives with equal effectiveness. I disagree
with this viewpoint.7' To be sure, deconstruction is a method (or
methods), but it is more than that. Hence, while deconstruction is
politically ambivalent enough that it can be invoked by progressives
and conservatives alike, it is not politically neutral.7 2 Rather,
deconstruction has political implications.
In the words of the
philosopher Richard J. Bernstein, Derridean deconstruction is
primarily "ethical-political-juridical,"7 3 and the political orientation of
deconstruction is progressive.7 4 Deconstruction relentlessly highlights
the oppression of the Other.
As is true of Gadamer and Habermas, Gadamer and Derrida
share much in common. They both, as already mentioned, reject
modernist subject-object metaphysics. Gadamer has explained that
71. See Feldman, supra note 38, at 196-97 (discussing J.M. Balkin's claim that
deconstruction is only a method).
72. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying
Elephant, 84 MINN. L. REV. 673, 709-10 (2000) (discussing the political ambivalence of
postmodern thought).
73. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, An Allegory of Modernity/Postmodernity: Habermas and
Derrida,in THE NEW CONSTELLATION 199, 209 (1991).
74. See Feldman, supra note 38, at 192-201 (discussing the politics of deconstruction).
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"Derrida, too, is endeavoring to supersede any metaphysical realm of
meaning which governs words and their meanings."75 Since both
Gadamer and Derrida then proceed to identify the conditions for
human understanding, their approaches overlap considerably. For
instance, deconstruction "echoes the ontological message of
philosophical hermeneutics-that we are always and already
interpreting. 7 6 Likewise, just as Gadamer asserts that we are always
embedded within our communal traditions, Derrida insists that our
' '77
conceptual apparatus must arise "from the text of a heritage.
Gadamer and Derrida would agree, moreover, that "truth keeps
happening";78 no one textual meaning remains stable or fixed in all
contexts.
Paradoxically, perhaps, with regard to the dispute between
Gadamer and Habermas, Derrida agrees partly with one and partly
with the other. Like Habermas, Derrida seeks to be more critical
than Gadamer does. Derrida agrees with Habermas, in particular,
that Gadamer is far too sanguine about the legitimacy of tradition.
Yet, whereas Habermas aims to purify communicative action of all
distortive forces, Derrida aims to demonstrate that communication
and understanding can never be so purified. Thus Derrida, in effect,
agrees with Gadamer's criticism of Habermas's claim that we can
have a meta-hermeneutic method that transcends tradition.
The key to understanding Derrida's critical method lies at a point
where Derrida diverges from both Gadamer and Habermas.
Gadamer and Habermas emphasize that consensus or agreement
plays a crucial role in the hermeneutic process. Gadamer stresses the
consensus that arises between interpreter and text within the
conversation or dialogue of the hermeneutic process. Habermas
emphasizes the consensus that would emerge among communicative
actors within the ideal speech situation. To Derrida, though, any
apparent consensus among a group of individuals is scarred by the
suppression of some Other.
Derrida explains that meaning is never firmly grounded but
rather always emerges from a play of signifiers. There are no stable
signifiers-no firm or objective foundations for interpretation-

75. Gadamer, Deconstruction,supra note 18, at 112.
76. Feldman, supra note 40, at 57.
77. DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 20, at 285.
78. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 18, at 9.
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rather, "there are nothing but signs. ' ' 79 The play of signifiers leads
Derrida to his notion of diff~rance:
[T]he signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a
sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and
lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within
which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the
systematic play of differences. Such a play, difflrance, is thus no
longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality,
of a conceptual process and system in general. For the same
reason, difflrance, which is not a concept, is not simply a word, that
is, what is generally represented as the calm, present, and selfreferential unity of concept and phonic material.8 0
To Derrida, every hermeneutic event, every grasp of meaning,
necessarily relies on some marginalized Other. Thus, whereas
Gadamer emphasizes how the hermeneutic process empowers us,
how we are enabled to understand texts, text-analogues, and each
other, Derrida instead stresses a disempowering component within
the hermeneutic process. To be certain, "a hermeneutic act produces
meaning and empowers certain individuals and societal groups," but
Derrida wants us never to forget that the same hermeneutic act
"simultaneously represses and destroys potential meaning and
disempowers other individuals and groups. ' 81 Putting this deconstructive point in Gadamerian terms, whenever we understand a text,
our prejudices necessarily prevent us from recognizing some potential
textual meanings. Furthermore, the traditions that imbued us with
our prejudices arose not from a purified culture (akin to Habermas's
ideal speech situation) but rather from a culture riddled with
oppression, brutality, and duplicity. Any tradition, according to
Derrida, subjugates and hides some Other-some minority (or
minorities), some outgroup (or outgroups), or some other
82
marginalized people.
The methods of deconstruction thus aim at uncovering the traces
of the Other that normally remain hidden in the margins. Derrida,
though, is not as programmatic as Habermas. While Habermas
carefully articulates his critical method, Derrida and other
deconstructionists more often demonstrate various critical methods
through their deconstructive readings of different texts. In other
79. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 20, at 50.
80. JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 11 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. Chicago
Press 1982) (1972).
81. Feldman, supra note 40, at 61.
82. See id. at 58.
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words, there is no one deconstructive method; rather there are
deconstructive methods.83 One deconstructive approach is to focus on
the production of tradition that undergirds a commonly accepted
reading of a text. Tradition usually works best when it remains in the
background. A plain meaning, for instance, seems to jump off a page
only if we uncritically accept certain assumptions or prejudices that
seem to ground the supposedly plain meaning." Such assumptions
necessarily arise from a tradition that lurks in the background of the
hermeneutic process. A deconstructionist might struggle to bring the
background to the foreground. Such a deconstruction would, in other
words, thematize the tradition and its corresponding assumptions and
prejudices. Questions such as the following would appear. Exactly
what cultural assumptions or prejudices undergird the supposedly
plain meaning of the text? What alternative meanings might emerge
from the text if we had different cultural prejudices? Whose voice or
claim-what cultural Other-has been denied or oppressed in our
85
ordinarily enthusiastic acceptance of the plain textual meaning?
This type of deconstructive inquiry into background traditions
and prejudices can take the form of a critical history in the
Foucauldian vein. 86 Often times, our current assumptions seem

83. For an excellent illustration of a deconstructive approach in a jurisprudential context,
see J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
1613 (1990) (deconstructing a Supreme Court case).
84. "A meaning that seems to leap off the page, propelled by its own self-sufficiency, is a
meaning that flows from interpretive assumptions so deeply embedded that they have become
invisible." STANLEY FISH, Still Wrong After All These Years, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY 356, 358 (1989).
85. Elsewhere, I have suggested an alternative deconstructive approach:
[P]ostmodern themes emerge in this Article as I (with the reader) perform a series of
postmodern flips. A postmodern flip is a gestalt switch or paradigm move that
reverses our prior approach to a text (or an event or a concept) and, in so doing,
reveals previously unrecognized features of that text. Whereas modernists constantly
attempt to reduce the meanings of texts to an essential core or single truth,
According to
postmodernists are anti-foundationalists and anti-essentialists.
postmodernists, the meaning of a text is never grounded or stable, and therefore one
can always find multiple meanings or truths. Thus, one performs a postmodern flip by
taking a segment of a text, event, or concept that apparently has been reduced to a
static meaning or truth and suggesting the possible existence of another (often
radically different) meaning or truth. This alternative meaning or truth often emerges
after one uncovers and disturbs the usually tacit assumptions underlying the original
meaning. The postmodern flip then is completed by exploring how this new meaning
or truth of the segment of the text, event, or concept might reorient one's
understanding of the whole.
Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial
Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 88
NW. U. L. REV. 1046, 1048 (1994).
86. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975) (exploring the history of prisons).
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neutral or natural. They do not appear to be cultural at all. A
historical inquiry into the origins and development of such current
assumptions, however, can reveal that they emerged from a
distinctive cultural viewpoint-a cultural viewpoint that obscured and
oppressed alternative cultural viewpoints. For example, I have
elsewhere argued that the idea of the separation of church and state
emerged from a Protestant-Christian culture and, as such, has
predominantly (though not solely) reflected the interests of the
Protestant majority in American society.87
Regardless of the specific deconstructive method that is used, all
deconstructions seek to disturb the dominant or privileged viewpoint.
Any textual meaning, no matter how common, no matter how clear, is
due partly to violence. Any consensus, any community in apparent
harmony, conceals some marginalized Other. In the words of
Derrida, "[t]he privilege granted to unity, to totality, to organic
ensembles, to community as a homogenized whole-this is a
danger... for ethics, for politics." 88 In fact, from this viewpoint, a
Habermasian critique itself can be understood as a type of
deconstruction insofar as it attempts to identify the forces that distort
communication. But a crucial difference between Habermas and
Derrida, themselves, is that Habermas believes communication can
be purified of distortive forces so that we can achieve universal truths,
while Derrida insists there always exists some oppressed Other. To
Derrida, every text, "even a postmodern deconstructive text, can be
deconstructed. 89
Finally, it is worth noting that Derridean deconstruction is, from
one vantage, parasitic on philosophical hermeneutics. It is the
understanding of meaning that engenders deconstruction. Without
understanding, as explained by Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, deconstruction could not begin in the first place. Moreover,
the very concepts that a deconstructionist must use in order to
deconstruct a text are necessarily understood through the
hermeneutic process. Critique is not possible without understanding,
and Gadamer's hermeneutics explains how understanding occurs.
(Although from a different vantage, we might emphasize that
deconstruction reveals how every understanding also contains a
87. See generally STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS:
A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997).
88. DERRIDA, NUTSHELL, supra note 20, at 13.
89. Stephen M. Feldman, Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox,
85 VA. L. REv. 151,178 (1999).
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misunderstanding-that hermeneutics, in other words, is parasitic on
deconstruction).
CONCLUSION

Many opponents of critical legal thinkers assert that it is easy to
be critical but hard to be constructive. From this perspective, critical
legal activity is simple, while traditional theory is difficult. I disagree.
Gadamer's emphasis on the role and power of tradition in the
hermeneutic process suggests how tradition forcefully constrains us.
Our prejudices, derived from our communal traditions, limit what we
can understand and perceive. Thus, to perform critical activity proves
often to be a formidable challenge. It requires the writer somehow to
disrupt the reader's basic and deep-seated assumptions- assumptions
that typically emerge from a dominant culture and that have been
inculcated and reinforced for much (or all) of the reader's life. This
type of critical work, to be effective, often requires more imagination
and originality than a straightforward prescription for change, which
one would see in traditional theory.
Despite the difficulty of engaging in critical work, Gadamer's
persuasive explanation of the hermeneutic process also elucidates
how critical activity is possible in the first place. We can understand
critical concepts or tools only because we participate in our
communal traditions. Our prejudices, from our traditions, open us to
the possibility of comprehending meaning. If not for our interpretive
being-in-the-world, we could not even begin to think critically (or in
any other manner!).
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics thus explains how critical
legal activity is possible yet difficult. Significantly, then, Gadamer
does not attempt to develop any method to guide critical activity.
Gadamer should not necessarily be faulted for this lacuna. His
primary purpose is to explain how we come to understand a text, and
he accomplishes this task admirably. But, as I have argued, various
methods can orient interpretation and understanding toward critique.
In particular, Habermas's discourse theory and Derrida's
deconstruction can be invoked to guide critical legal activity. Other
critical methods are also possible; no one or two methods can possibly
guide all critical activities. 90 For example, a critical perspective can be

90. See generally PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (3d ed. 1993) (arguing that
science has not progressed through the application of some single monolithic scientific method).
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generated by combining a cultural with a sociological analysis.

In

particular, a critical thinker can attempt to focus on discrepancies
between cultural messages and social structures.91

If a dominant

cultural message is that everyone has equal liberty, but the society is
actually structured otherwise-say, there are gross disparities of
wealth-then we might conclude that the cultural message or symbol
is ideological. The cultural message, that is, tends to obscure rather
92
than accurately depict the true social relationships.

Ultimately, regardless of the specific contours of a critical
method, any such method would tend to encourage us to self-

consciously spotlight aspects of the horizon beyond the narrow point
that is normally illuminated. A critical method brings the background
to the foreground so that we can examine some of our tacit cultural
assumptions. Such critical activity certainly cannot liberate us from
our interpretive being-in-the-world or from the social reality of living
within certain communal traditions. But critical activity, if successful,
can at least change how (or what) we see or understand and might
eventually transform our world.

91. This critical approach resonates with Habermas's critical method insofar as he
distinguishes between the symbolic reproduction of our lifeworld and the strategic interaction
and material reproduction of our economic and administrative systems. See 1 HABERMAS, THE
THEORY, supra note 19, at 340-43; 2 HABERMAS, THE THEORY, supra note 19, at 150-52.
92. I elaborate and apply this type of critical method in my book on the separation of
church and state. I argue that, on the one hand, the constitutional principle of separation of
church and state supposedly protects the religious liberty of all Americans equally. But the
social reality is otherwise. Members of minority and outgroup religions generally do not receive
the same level of protection as members of the more mainstream Christian religions. See
FELDMAN, supra note 87, at 255-82.

